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ABSTRACT 
Catalonia is one of a few European separatist movements that have real significance in 
the European political sphere. Separatism is new to Catalonia, however Catalan 
nationalism is not. Through the analysis of primary and secondary sources, this thesis 
explains that the reason the Catalan nationalist movement is so strong and demands the 
attention it is receiving in the Spanish national and international communities is the long-
standing political, economic, and cultural foundations that have been building even 
before Catalonia was formed. Likewise, these foundations combined with the triggering 
events of the recession of the late 2000s and the Spanish constitutional court ruling on 
the revised Catalan Statute of Autonomy caused a shift in the movement towards 
separatism. 
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Part I: Introduction 
In 2014, three European regions held referendums regarding their 
independence from their host country: Veneto, Scotland, and Catalonia. In Venice, 
almost 89% of voters in the non-binding straw poll said they wanted Veneto to 
become an independent state (Ford 2014). Scotland held a legal and binding 
referendum in September 2014 that asked ‘Should Scotland be an independent 
country?’ in which the majority (55%) voted against independence 
(scotreferendum.com). Finally, in Catalonia, a non-binding referendum was held in 
November. The Catalan people were asked two questions: “Do you want Catalonia to 
become a state?” and “Do you want this State to be independent?” Even though an 
official vote was declared illegal by the courts in Madrid, the vote proceeded as an 
unofficial straw poll with 2.3 million out of 5 million eligible voters turning out and 
80% voting “Yes” to both questions (Minder, 2014). 
  The formation of states in Europe has for centuries consisted of the 
integration of different groups and cultures under a single flag. France for example 
now encompasses the former distinct regions of Brittany, Aquitaine, the French 
Basque Country, Occitania, and Corsica among others. Most of these regions 
maintain a sense of regional identity, yet separatism is either non-existent or not 
powerful enough to warrant significant political attention. Likewise, the French 
national identity transcends the regional identities, delegating regional identities to 
be expressed through cultural differences (language, traditions, food etc.). Many 
European countries are in similar situations; Spain, however, is an exception. 
Though Spain has a similar history of combining cultures, Catalonia has maintained 
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its strong regional identity and has established one of the few regionalist 
movements in Europe that has real political significance within the EU (the others 
being Scotland and perhaps Flanders). Catalan nationalist parties are in power 
within Catalonia and hold 16 seats in the Spanish national parliament (Congreso de 
los Diputados). Demands for Catalan autonomy have been present since the official 
establishment of a Catalan nationalist movement in the 19th century; however a 
Catalan identity has arguably been in place since the early middle ages. Today, 
Catalan nationalism is even more significant as the movement has recently made the 
shift to separatism, further increasing its significance within Europe.  
Though separatism in Catalonia is new, nationalism is not. Tensions between 
Spain and Catalonia have been notoriously strained since Catalonia came under 
Spanish rule in 1714 during the War of Spanish Succession. In the 19th century, the 
nationalist movement emerged and called for greater autonomy for Catalonia. The 
movement later dealt with the problems Catalonia faced throughout the 19th and 
20th centuries including the dictatorships of Miguel Primo de Rivera and Francisco 
Franco. After the death of Franco in 1975, the nationalist movement began moving 
in a different direction. As the first decade of the 21st century came to a close, the 
movement developed further as nationalists began demanding independence.  
It is obvious that there are factors involved with Catalonia that allow it to 
remain not only a strong region within Spain, but also allow it to develop a 
nationalist movement that is a significant political force within the EU. This thesis 
seeks to understand this strength as well as the movement’s shift to separatism. 
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Why is Catalonia’s nationalist movement so strong? And why has the movement 
now shifted to separatism?  
In this thesis, I argue that cultural, economic, and political factors explain the 
exceptional strength of Catalan nationalism throughout history and in the present. 
These factors also explain the movement’s shift to separatism in combination with 
economic and political triggers.  As we will see below, previous literature explains 
separatism through these cultural, economic, and political factors. I use these three 
to explain not only the shift to separatism, but also the long term strength of Catalan 
nationalism.  
Culturally, the idea of a distinct Catalan identity has been in place since the 
middle ages. Catalan, a Romance language similar to Spanish and French, developed 
during this time and is still spoken by almost 90% of the population with many in 
rural areas using it as their primary language (IDESCAT). Spanish leaders, from the 
Castilian monarchs to Primo de Rivera and eventually Franco have attempted to 
subdue this identity and instead promote the traditional Castilian ideals in Catalan 
society. Yet the failures of these leaders is evident in Catalan cities. The classic 
Spanish symbol of the bull is rarely found in Catalonia and traditional Catalan 
festivals take the place of Spanish ones celebrated in other parts of the country. The 
Catalan identity remains and sets the basic foundation for all nationalist and 
separatist ideas. Furthermore, the rise in awareness of Catalan culture post-Franco 
has strengthened this foundation. Education reforms, promotion of the Catalan 
language, success of Catalan filmmakers and authors, as well as the observance of 
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Catalan traditions and holidays also built up this foundation for those living in post-
Franco society.  
Political factors have shaped Catalan national experience and identity 
historically as well as in the present era.  In earlier periods, political factors 
determined the territory considered to be Catalonia and the varying levels of 
autonomy Catalonia experienced over time.  Since the death of Franco and Spain’s 
transition to democracy, the political structure of Spain and Catalonia, specifically 
the decentralized state, the large level of autonomy of Catalonia, the presence and 
success of Catalan nationalist political parties, as well as the presence of 
international organizations like the EU and NATO created a foundation that 
strengthened the Catalan nationalist movement and eventually led to separatism. 
The Generalitat, the official name for the Catalan parliamentary government is one 
of the most powerful regional governments in Spain, with Catalonia having more 
autonomy than most of the other 17 autonomous communities within Spain. These 
communities have the ability to choose their own level of autonomy, as long as it is 
within the guidelines of the Spanish constitution (“History of the Government of 
Catalonia”). This decentralization, coupled with other factors, contributes to the 
formation of a Catalan identity rather than a Spanish identity as it puts more power 
in the hands of local governments versus national governments. Along this line, the 
presence and popularity of Catalan-only political parties contributes to this idea of 
Catalan nationality. It creates an easy path for the Catalan politicians to participate 
in the separatist movement without disrupting any ties to political parties outside of 
Catalonia. For example, the current president, Artur Más, head of the Catalan 
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Convergence and Union party, is also the head of the Catalan separatist movement 
(“History of the Government of Catalonia”). Likewise, the presence of the EU and 
NATO are also important to Catalan nationalism. The EU is very supportive of 
regional rights, as evidenced by the Maastricht Treaty and other programs which 
protect linguistic and cultural rights of regions (Connolly, 2013: 3). The EU 
legitimizes Catalan claims to regional identity and provides an outlet for Catalan 
nationalists to interact with other European nations and regions. Likewise, the mere 
presence of NATO and the EU strengthen separatist claims that Catalonia will be 
able to survive outside of Spain as the two organizations provide many of the 
competencies that could cause difficulty to a small, newly independent state such as 
formation of a new currency, foreign policy, and security (Bieri 2014: 3). 
Catalonia’s economic history also plays a huge role in the development of 
Catalan nationalism. Catalonia’s economy has almost always been more prosperous 
than Spain. That is to say, Catalonia has almost always been one step ahead of Spain 
in regards to industry, trade, and tourism. From Roman times to present day, 
Barcelona has been a hub of trade, immigration, industry, and tourism, propelling 
Catalonia’s GDP per capita past Spain’s and into the top of the EU rankings. 
Barcelona is home to 5 million of Catalonia’s  7.5 million citizens and a diverse 
collection of businesses ranging from investment banks like Caixabank to candy 
company Chupa Chups.  Inland provinces of Catalonia are home to wineries that 
rival southern France and much of the olive oil exported from Spain originates in 
Catalonia (“Politics and Economy”).  All of these factors make Catalonia’s economy 
one of the strongest in a weak Spanish system. Catalan GDP represents 19% of 
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Spain’s economy, the highest of any of the autonomous communities (OECD 2015). 
Therefore, Catalonia, as one of the most successful and most autonomous regions in 
Spain, pays higher taxes yet receives a lower percentage in return of that money 
because of its success and high level autonomy(“Politics and Economy”). These 
issues come together to create a solid foundation for separatism. 
The political, cultural, and economic foundations strengthen the nationalist 
movement. However, for the movement to adopt the demand of separatism, there 
must be a triggering event (or two) to cause that shift. For Catalonia, these events 
were the court ruling on the revisions on the Statute of Autonomy in 2006 and the 
recession of the late 2000s. The details of the ruling and the consequences of the 
recession will be discussed in full later, however, it is important to note that both 
events were significant in that they signaled the Spanish government’s 
unwillingness to negotiate with Catalan demands for higher autonomy and both 
parties’ inability to cooperate in times of economic crisis. The court ruling caused an 
immediate public response setting off a chain of events that would lead to the 
Catalan nationalist movement to take on the new goal of independence. Likewise, 
the recession served to amplify the economic grievances already present between 
Catalonia and Spain, eventually pushing both the Spanish and Catalan governments 
to a gridlock. These events would not have had the same effect, however, without 
the solid political, cultural, and economic foundations that had been building 
throughout history and specifically since the death of Franco as well as the political 
actors who were vital in helping the movement grow.  
Literature Review 
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Before examining the Catalan separatist movement, it is important to note 
previous literature on why separatist movements emerge. There are three main 
theories as to why separatist movements arise. Some authors claim that separatist 
movements emerge due to cultural factors in a region. Others state that economic 
factors are the driving force behind separatist movements. Finally, some scholars 
believe separatist movements emerge due to political factors. 
Anthony Smith is one of the most prominent proponents of the “culture” 
theory of why separatist movements arise.  Smith argues that an ethnic movement 
“presuppose[s] a definite historic community based upon shared memories and 
culture, in whose name the separation of the unit is claimed,” (Smith, 1979: 22). 
Such movements seek to recover a cultural identity that has been lost and/or 
corrupted by outside influences. Thus, nationalist movements seek to reestablish 
their culture apart from the state.  Finally, Smith notes that culturally based 
separatisms, because they are a distinct ethnic community, hold the same rights as 
other communities to run their own internal and external affairs without outside 
influence (Smith, 1979: 22).  
Unlike other authors, Smith states that, although economic factors are 
relevant in the separatism discussion, the theory that separatism arises due to 
regional neglect from government officials and programs causing 
underdevelopment is inadequate. The theory is inapplicable to Catalonia, the 
Basque country, Flanders, Scotland etc. as they are all highly developed with varying 
levels of government participation and assistance. Despite this fact, Smith does say 
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that neglect from a government could influence the movement after it has emerged. 
In this case, the level of neglect could influence whether the movement searches for 
separation from the state, or simply more autonomy. Instead, Smith states, the 
emergence of a separatist movement can be explained by a revival in literature and 
a greater interest in the past. According to Smith, the Enlightenment of the 18th 
century brought about the emergence of nationalism and historicism, which is the 
emphasis on the past to relate to issues of the day. The revival of literature and 
other cultural markers by an ethnic group helps to solidify an identity unique to the 
one of the large scale state under which they live; it provides a sense of unity to the 
ethnic group and a feeling of being separate from different ethnic groups. This 
historicism was brought about by the disillusionment and frustration with 
bureaucracy by intellectuals, who then turned to the past in search of a rationale for 
their current situation (Smith, 1979: 23-30).  
Moreno, Arriba and Serrano (1998) are also proponents of the culture 
theory, and they argue ethno-territorialism leads to regionalism and separatism 
using the examples of Catalonia, the Basque Country, Asturias and Galicia in Spain. 
The strong dual identity amongst Spaniards, stemming from strong cultural ties to 
their region as well as ties to Spain as a whole, has led to the emergence of 
nationalist and secessionist movements. Strong ties to each other and their own 
culture along with weaker ties to the state could transform the nationalist 
movement into a more drastic separatist one. In Spain, stronger ties to regions (the 
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia) strengthen regionalism while feebler ties to 
Spain weaken Spanish nationalism. The lack of a strong central government in 
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Madrid, long lasting ties to ethnic regions and the acknowledgment of these regions’ 
unique culture by Madrid creates this dual identity for many Spaniards (Moreno et. 
al., 1998: 70).  
 Stanley Payne also discusses the potential causes of cultural nationalism and 
regionalism in Spain from the 19th century to 1991. He theorizes that specific 
characteristics of Spain itself play a role in the emergence of micro-nationalism and 
regionalism in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Payne argues that the 
decentralized nature of the Spanish monarchy along with the lack of major 
participation of Spain in the World Wars, the slower pace of modernization, and the 
lack of an external threat to Spanish society after Napoleon’s defeat have inhibited 
the growth of a true Spanish identity (Payne, 1991: 479). This lack of Spanish 
nationalism has paved the way for regionalism and micro-nationalism. Payne argues 
that the micro-nationalism that was developed in mid-19th century Catalonia was a 
protest against the frustrations of the process of modernization and a reaction 
against the relative failure of liberalism in Spain. Using the Basque Country and 
Catalonia as examples, Payne states that even though there is no agreement on the 
cause of modern nationalism, he theorizes that appearance of nationalism is 
influenced by “foreign oppression, menace or military defeat on the one hand, 
and/or the beginning of cultural and economic modernization which threaten the 
traditional values or way of life on the other” (Payne, 1991: 484-85).  
 Donald Horowitz (1981) explains that an ethnic group’s desire to secede 
stems not from cultural influences but rather economic influences. He begins by 
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stating that “whether a secessionist movement will emerge at all is determined by 
domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state” (Horowitz 
1981, 167). Yet, whether a secessionist movement will actually achieve its aims, is 
determined by international politics and forces at work beyond the state.  To 
examine this, he categorizes certain ethnic groups as being either backward in a 
backward regional economy, backward in an advanced regional economy, advanced 
in a backward regional economy, or advanced in an advanced regional economy 
(such as the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country). Backwards groups are 
defined by average levels of education, income and professional employment 
whereas advanced groups have higher than average levels in the same categories. 
Backwards regional economies are defined as those that are performing poorly as 
compared to the surrounding economies and advanced regional economies are 
those that are performing better than the surrounding economies. Horowitz finds 
that, although the majority of secessionist movements are those of backwards 
groups with backwards regional economies, advanced groups with advanced 
regional economies, such as the Catalans, would be more likely to form a separatist 
movement because of an economic grievance such as the belief that their tax dollars 
are subsidizing poorer regions of the state. Horowitz concludes that backwards 
groups are more likely to develop a separatist movement, but that does not mean 
that advanced groups won’t also have separatism emerge. Economic factors are the 
main political claims in advanced groups, and although separatism is rare, it still 
occurs (Horowitz, 1981: 167-92). This can be explained by the presence of other 
factors, including cultural and political .  
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 Evan Osborne (2010) takes a similar approach. He argues that the economy 
is an important factor in regards to ethnic separatism movements. More specifically, 
he argues that “when economic freedom is greater people cooperate more, fight less 
and trust one another more,” (Osborne, 2010: 378). Basically, when ethnic groups 
have rights to assert their own economic policies and strategies they are less likely 
to engage in ethnic conflict and separatist movements.  
Ryan D. Griffiths and Ivan Savic (2009) agree that the economy is one of the 
most important factors in a separatist movement. They state that economic 
interdependence  within the state can increase the likelihood for conflict but also 
has an effect on the goals of separatist movements set for themselves. The authors 
argue that the economic calculus of separatism, “How will the movement be funded? 
What will be the economic consequences of a particular strategy or action? What 
will the economic future look like if greater autonomy or independence is achieved,” 
along with the effect of two-dimensional interdependence and the push and pull of 
globalization are three main factors influencing separatist movements (Griffths and 
Savic, 2009: 430-31).  
 Michael Freeman is a proponent of the third theory of why separatist 
movements emerge. He states in his article “The Priority of Function over Structure: 
A New Approach to Secession.” that secessionism may be brought about by the 
switch from an authoritarian rule to that of a democracy. He says “The 
deconstruction of authoritarian rule can leave communal groups politically, 
economically, and culturally insecure, and consequently tempted to fight for 
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statehood,” (Freeman, 1998: 15). The sudden relief of oppression brought on by 
authoritarian rule can spark a new desire in ethnic groups to begin or restart 
separatist movements that have been oppressed under the dictatorship.  
Toni Rodon is in agreement with this theory. Under authoritarian rule, any 
movements that could be seen as dissent from the dictatorship in power are quickly 
suppressed often under threat of violence. This hampers the growth of a nationalist 
movement as the movement then has to go underground or resort to violent 
methods in order to continue. But, when the authoritarian rule lifts, the movement 
is suddenly revitalized and often transforms from a nationalist movement to a 
separatist movement with new goals to become independent and, ideally, stay free 
from similar oppression like the one just endured (Rodon, 2012: 136).  
 To summarize, separatism emerges because of political, economic, or cultural 
factors. In the case of Catalonia, these factors created a strong nationalist movement 
that developed into separatism because of all these factors as well as specific 
triggering events which caused the direct shift to separatism. The presence of a dual 
identity as well as economic and political grievances caused the Catalan nationalist 
movement to evolve into a separatist movement because of the combination of 
these foundations and the triggering events of the late 2000s. In this thesis I will 
attempt to demonstrate that the economic, political, and cultural foundations which 
developed through Catalan history not only contributed to the strength of Catalan 
nationalism, but eventually caused separatism to emerge.  
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Part II: Historical Foundations of Catalan Nationalism 
 To better contextualize the Catalan nationalist movement, it is first necessary 
to understand the origins of Catalonia and the beginnings of political, economic, and 
cultural foundations. Though it may seem extreme to begin this study thousands of 
years before separatism became a reality in Catalonia, it is necessary to truly see 
how early the foundations begin to form. The history of Catalonia is rich and 
complicated. From the early days of its formation, before the concept of separate 
Catalan and Spanish identities even existed, political, economic, and cultural 
patterns developed.  
The Golden Age of Catalonia 
Catalonia and the rest of Spain were originally populated by the native 
Iberians from whom the name Iberian Peninsula is derived. The Iberians were soon 
joined by other groups who migrated into the peninsula during the 14th century BCE 
(Smith 4). In The Phoenicians arrived in the 11th century followed soon after by the 
Carthaginians, whose greatest contribution to the formation of Catalonia was the 
establishment the bustling port city of Barcino, (now Barcelona) (R. Smith, 1965: 5).    
The Romans invaded the Iberian peninsula in the 1st century B.C.E. 
Northeastern Spain became the first region conquered by the Romans, who made 
Tarraco, (modern day Tarragona), the capital of the northern province of Roman 
Hispania (Chaytor, 19331). The Romans Latinized the peninsula, integrating Roman 
ideals and traditions with the existing culture. Hispania adapted well to the Roman 
                                                          
1
 Chaytor’s book was accessed through an online portal and there for page numbers were unavailable 
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conquest and the beginnings of a Spanish identity was born. The influence of Latin 
on Hispania was unparalleled in the Roman Empire. The beginning of many of the 
Romance languages, Catalan included, began on the Iberian Peninsula. Latin began 
to mix with tribal languages forming very primitive versions of Spanish, Galician, 
and Catalan. Poets and authors from Spain became well known throughout the 
Empire and future Roman leaders like Marcus Aurelius and Hadrian were Spaniards 
themselves (R. Smith 1965, 6). Like many other European nations, the Roman 
Empire brought Christianity to Hispania which quickly gained a foothold in Hispanic 
society as well (Chaytor, 1933).  
The economic roots of Catalonia and Spain began in this time period. Trade 
and commerce were especially prevalent in port cities like Barcino while agriculture 
and mining were the main economies of the inland provinces (Chaytor, 1933).  
Hispania was a relatively wealthy province under Roman rule and remained that 
way even after the Romans were replaced by the Visigoths in the 4th century C.E. (R. 
Smith, 1965: 6). Specifically, the region which would become Catalonia was 
especially viable as it was the main port of entry into the rest of Hispania from the 
Mediterranean (Chaytor, 1933). Tarragona as well became an important agricultural 
center for the peninsula.  
Though there was no distinction between Catalonia and Spain at this time, it 
could be argued that the economic and political importance of the cities of 
Tarragona and Barcino sets the stage for further development of the separate 
cultures of Catalonia and Spain. As the seat of the Roman rule was in modern-day 
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Catalonia, it became an important location for politics and governance. Even after 
the Roman presence was gone from Spain, the Visigoths continued to rely on 
Barcinona for trade and commerce up until the conquest of the peninsula by the 
Moors from North Africa in 718. (Chaytor, 1933)  
The Muslim Conquest is seen as one of the most important events in Spanish, 
Catalan, and European history. The Moors ruled over the Iberian Peninsula for over 
700 years, one of the longest reigns of any group in Iberia. However, Catalonia did 
not remain under Moorish control for long. In 732, the region surrounding 
Barcinona won its independence from the Al-Andalus Empire after a few bloody 
battles. The non-Moor residents, consisting mainly of Visigoths, took control of the 
region and decided to align with their northern neighbors, the Franks, to help 
protect themselves from invaders (R. Smith, 1965: 20-25). Under this agreement, 
Catalonia obtained a semi-autonomous rule that enjoyed certain freedoms, but still 
required payment for the protection of the Franks (Chaytor, 1933). For decades 
Catalonia thrived under this system and was protected from the Muslim empire to 
the south. However, in the mid-8th century, after the Reconquista of the Iberian 
Peninsula began, Charlemagne conquered Barcinona (renaming it to Barcelona) and 
surrounding areas, stripping the Catalans of whatever autonomy they had possessed 
and incorporating the area under Frankish control (Chaytor, 1933). He called the 
region Hispanica Marca, or Spanish March, using the region as a battle ground for 
the Reconquista.   
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 In Spain, language, customs, social and legal codes, religion, and even 
architecture were heavily influenced by the Muslim rulers. Catalonia’s culture 
however was less influenced by the Moors and more influenced by the alliance with 
the Franks. At this time, there was already a distinction beginning between the 
dialects of Vulgar Latin spoken in the northern regions of Spain and in the southern 
regions of Spain (Chaytor, 1933). This northern dialect of Latin was less influenced 
by the Arabic of the Moors, and took more of the Latin dialects and Occitan in 
southern France. From these dialects formed the ancestor of the Catalan language, 
which became an official language in the 10th century. Furthermore, the divide 
between Muslim Spain and Frankish Catalonia grew stronger because of lack of 
contact between the two regions. The constant battles led to less trade and 
commerce between the two, decreasing the amount of contact and influence that 
citizens of both regions had on each other (R. Smith, 1965).  
To help control the region, Charlemagne appointed a count to govern and 
report back to him. This helped to define the boundaries of Barcelona, further 
implying a divide between this region and those around it. This divide became so 
great that eventually the weakening power of the Carolingian Empire could not hold 
on to the province of Barcelona any more. Under the leadership of the uniquely 
named Count Wilfred the Hairy, the provinces of Urgell, Cerdanya, Girona, and 
Barcelona became independent from the Carolingian Empire and Catalonia was 
created.  For over 100 years Catalonia was an independent nation with their own 
laws called los fueros. These laws and codes protected Catalan citizens and formed 
order within Catalan borders. (Chaytor, 1933) 
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 Wilfred expanded the new nation of Catalonia, with borders eventually 
stretching south to Muslim Valencia and north to the Pyrenees.  In the 11th and 12th 
centuries, Wilfred’s successor, Ramon Berenguer III further expanded Catalonia all 
the way into Southern France, Aragon, and the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean 
Sea. Convenient marriages and an alliance with the Kingdom of Aragon helped 
Berenguer’s successor to expand Catalonia even farther to include much of 
northwestern Spain and parts of Italy and southern France (Chaytor, 1933).  
Catalonia benefitted from the alliance with Aragon greatly because it 
provided not only a new market for trade of Catalan goods, but also allowed for the 
transportation and trade of agricultural goods from the fertile grasslands of Aragon 
to the Port of Barcelona and on to other parts of the Mediterranean. As Catalonia 
and Aragon expanded, so did the opportunity for trade. Catalan goods were traded 
across the Mediterranean as well as more inland in Europe. Catalonia remained 
prosperous and thus was able to dominate the Aragon political sphere. The rulers of 
Aragon were Catalan, not Aragonese and thus gave priority to Catalan interests 
when making political decisions. (Chaytor, 1933) 
Likewise, this economic and political dominance helped to keep Aragon and 
Catalan culture relatively separate. Catalan traditions spread across the eastern 
portion of the kingdom while Aragon culture and language spread along the west. 
The two entities had separate legal codes as well. The Cortes de Catalonia or Catalan 
legal codes were in place at this time, creating a system of government that 
maintained relative order and peace throughout Catalan territories (Chaytor, 1933). 
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The codes maintained order allowing for the political, economic, and cultural 
expansion of Catalonia throughout the 12th and 13th centuries. The 12th century 
brought an alliance with the Kingdom of Castile, coordinated by the famous King 
Alfonso II in an attempt to present a unified front against the Muslim kingdom to the 
south (R. Smith, 1965). The alliance was successful in pushing back the Moors and 
expanding the Christian kingdoms until they possessed much of the north and parts 
of the south. This time period is often called the “golden age” of Catalonia and later 
became the topic of Romantic writings in the 19th century. Though shifts in alliances, 
minor invasions, and loss and gain of territories occurred during this time, Catalonia 
maintained its power in the Iberian Peninsula and beyond. (Chaytor, 1933) 
Yet as the 14th century approached, Catalonia began to weaken. Lack of 
heirs, familial conflict, and powerful neighbors weakened Catalonia’s power within 
the Kingdom of Aragon. The loss of key provinces in Spain and Italy weakened the 
faith in the Catalan kings who had ruled over Aragon for the past 200 years. 
Frustration mounted with the lack of attention to the Aragon region as the kingdom 
was repeatedly attacked by outside forces. The alliance with Castile faltered until 
the two kingdoms were enemies again. Incidents of Aragon counts refusing to send 
troops to help defend the kingdom at the request of their Catalan king made fending 
off intruders even more difficult. This pattern of invasion and dissent continued into 
the 15th century as the Black Plague hit Catalonia especially hard. By the mid-15th 
century the Kingdom of Aragon was weak and divided. Catalonia and Aragon were 
united only on paper; their differences outweighing their similarities. This provided 
ample opportunity for the Kingdom of Castile made the most damage. In order to 
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salvage his power, Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabella of Castile in 1462, 
combining the two largest powers in Spain and beginning an era of reformation, 
inquisition, exploration and unification. (Chaytor, 1933, Edwards, 2000) 
Catalonia’s Place in Unified Spain 
The infamous reign of Ferdinand and Isabella became a pivotal point in 
Spanish history. The unified kingdom they created with their marriage became the 
base of Spain as it is known today. The so called Catholic monarchs brought about 
the end of the Reconquista and the start of the Spanish Inquisition. The Muslim 
kingdom was completely driven out of Spain in 1492 by the unified armies of 
Aragon and Castile. Their reign is characterized by the Inquisition and the beginning 
of the Spanish empire overseas (Edwards, 2000). 
In order to maintain their power over such a vast area, they tried to 
centralize their power. They removed lords, counts, and governors who had the 
power to incite a revolution or threatened their monarchy in any way. Their efforts 
were successful in most areas except for Catalonia. Technically, Aragon and Castile 
were still two separate kingdoms that had separate governing systems even after 
the unification. Catalonia became a principate of the kingdom of Aragon, still under 
control of the monarchs, but not completely. Catalonia caused trouble for the crown 
with the Catalan government refusing to pay interest on taxes to the crown and 
Catalan peasants revolting. (Edwards, 2000) Noblemen in the cities turned against 
Ferdinand especially when he attempted to control the region by appointing a new 
Castilian governor and dissolving the Generalitat (Chaytor, 1933). He eventually 
Jones 23 
 
reinstated the power of the Catalan regional government though his support from 
noblemen in Catalonia was almost completely diminished (Edwards, 2000).  
The political resistance of Catalonia contributed to the difficulty of the 
monarchs in their attempt to unite the country under a unified Castilian culture and 
language. The influence of the Castilian language (also known as Old Spanish) and 
traditions was spreading throughout Aragon, but Catalonia resisted these attempts. 
Catalan remained the primary language of the region even as the growth of Castilian 
stretched across the majority of the country and replaced other languages 
(Edwards, 2000). This created tension between the Catalan government and the 
monarchy which was frustrated with Catalan refusal to conform and worried of the 
implications a strong distinction in culture could cause. Catalonia, meanwhile, was 
frustrated with the growing encroachment on Catalan autonomy by Castilian tax 
and government representatives sent there by the monarchs (Chaytor, 1933).  
The tensions between Catalonia and Castile were exacerbated by Catalonia’s 
struggling economy. For the first time, the economic relevancy of Catalonia was 
dwindling. The Castilian government sent little help to the Barcelona ports that 
were overrun by piracy and the Catalan government refused to accept any 
interference from the monarchy. Competition increased from ports around the 
Mediterranean, specifically Naples and Valencia whose ports were much calmer 
than Barcelona’s. It took decades and many reforms from the Generalitat for 
Catalonia’s economy to recover, but by 1500, Catalonia again had a viable economy. 
Specifically, the 16th century expansion of Spain into the New World brought 
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prosperity. The Port of Barcelona became a popular port for the arrival of ships that 
had just crossed the Atlantic. (Chaytor, 1933) 
The end of the reign of the Catholic Monarchs in 1516 would bring political 
upheaval and huge changes for Catalan autonomy and Catalonia’s relationship with 
Spain. The 200 years following the death of the Ferdinand and Isabella, culminating 
in the complete loss of autonomy for Catalonia in 1714, laid the foundation for 
future Catalan/Spanish relations. Tensions were high as King Phillip III used Catalan 
resources, gold and manpower to fight off the French in the name of the Holy Roman 
Empire (Kern, 1990: 545). Catalonia’s border with France also meant Catalan 
citizens were forced to accommodate Castilian soldiers as they fought the French 
along the border. The destruction of crops, ill treatment from soldiers, forced 
quartering, and reallocation of resources along with the high taxes and declaration 
of the invalidity of the Catalan government by the Count-Duke of Olivares led to a 
revolt called the Reaper’s War that lasted almost 19 years (R. Smith, 1965: 230-3).  
In 1640 a riot was successful in killing the Castilian viceroy of Catalonia which led to 
attacks of the Castilian soldiers stationed in Catalonia (Kern, 1990: 545-7). Catalonia 
declared independence from the Crown of Spain while pronouncing Louis XIII, King 
of France, the Count of Barcelona. The French joined the Catalans in the fight against 
the Spanish until 1659 when the revolt was finally quashed and France received the 
Roussillon. Catalonia after the Reaper’s War was able to maintain the Generalitat 
and their rights under the Spanish Crown. However, Catalonia was significantly 
weakened from the Thirty Years War, the Reaper’s War, and the two Spanish wars 
with France that followed. (Kern, 1990: 545-550)   
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In 1700, the last Hapsburg king of Spain, Charles II, died without an heir, 
starting off a European wide conflict called the War of Spanish Succession. The war, 
lasting from 1700-1714 saw fighting from the Spanish Monarchy led by Bourbon 
Phillip V, grandson of the King of France, against Hapsburgs and their allies. The 
conflict lasted 14 years with fighting all over Europe and even into Spanish America 
(R. Smith, 1965: 234-7). In 1714, the Treaty of Utrecht was forced upon Phillip V and 
the Spanish, ceding much of Spanish territory to the Holy Roman Emperor, 
significantly reducing Spain’s influence along its eastern border (Kern, 1990: 543-
51, 485-7). The War of Spanish Succession also brought a huge change for the 
Catalans. During the war, Catalonia supported Phillip V in hopes that his reign would 
bring more autonomy. However, as the war came to a close, it became obvious that 
Phillip V only wanted to subdue the Catalans further. Peace negotiations during the 
war stated that Catalonia would enjoy the same amnesty and rights of other 
Spaniards but would lose their autonomy. This dissatisfied the Catalans who then 
declared war in 1713. The rebellion was quickly squashed in 1714 and the Nueva 
Planta decrees were put in place, effectively ending Catalan autonomy and 
incorporating it fully under the Spanish Crown based in Castile. (R.Smith, 1965: 234-
7). 
As the 18th century progressed, Catalonia continued to be governed 
completely by the reign of the Bourbon kings. More restriction of rights continued 
under the rule of Charles IV as he tried to avoid “revolutionary fever” from France. 
For Charles and the Spanish nobility, the French Revolution brought fear not only of 
revolution spilling over into Spain, but of war with France as well. Their fears came 
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true in 1793 when Spain yet again found itself at war with France. Catalonia was 
once more used as the frontier between France and Spain. Catalan soldiers won 
great victories around the Pyrenees, helping secure peace between the two nations. 
This peace did not last long, however, as Napoleon, after many trials and 
tribulations with the Spanish Royal Family, took over the Spanish Crown, ceding it 
to his brother Joseph Bonaparte. Spain was now under Napoleonic control (R. Smith, 
1965: 258-273). 
Joseph Bonaparte’s rule over Spain was not lengthy, but was important in 
shaping the landscape of 19th century Spain. Napoleonic ideas stemming from the 
French Revolution began to take hold in many Spanish households, making some 
Spaniards question the previous Bourbon absolutism. On March 19, 1812, after two 
years of discussion and debate, the Constitution of Cadiz was drafted. At this point in 
time, Spain was still under the control of Napoleon and France so the document was 
more of a statement than a legally binding constitution. However, the implications of 
the document, like the obvious change in ideology of many Spaniards, are evident. 
The Constitution called for popular sovereignty and election of government leaders, 
division of power, creation of social classes, and equal rights for all men. 
Unfortunately for Catalonia, however, the constitution also called for the 
centralization of the government, effectively removing any power the Catalan 
government had possessed (Kern, 1990: 164). On April 11, 1814, Napoleon 
abdicated the throne in Paris, thus ending his brother’s time as leader in Spain and 
his rule over half of Europe (R. Smith, 1965: 276).  
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Originally supported as a leader in the campaign against Napoleon, 
Ferdinand VII saw this support dissipate quickly after the French threat 
disappeared. During his short reign which ended in 1833, he divided Spain further 
and seemed to create more issues than he solved. In 1823, after years of fighting for 
absolutism and quelling a revolution, Ferdinand was forced to accept the 
Constitution of 1812 by his subjects, appeasing many Spaniards except the Basques 
and Catalans who now found themselves without much autonomy (R. Smith, 1965: 
312, Kern, 1990: 567). This led to revolts and uprisings all over Catalonia and the 
eventual support of the Catalans for Don Carlos in the upcoming Carlist wars (Kern, 
1990: 567). 
Perhaps the most significant part of Ferdinand’s short reign was the birth of 
his daughter Isabel and the political turmoil that her birth brought (Kern, 1990: 
569). Due to a proclamation by Ferdinand, Isabel was to inherit the throne when 
Ferdinand finally succumbed to his disease (R. Smith, 1965: 311). Ferdinand’s 
younger brother, Carlos, unhappy with his brother’s ruling style launched a 
campaign against Ferdinand to become King when he died (Kern, 1990: 569). 
Supporters for Prince Carlos, called Carlists, came mainly from Catalonia and the 
Basque Country (R. Smith, 1965: 314). The Basques and Catalans had lost their 
autonomy with the acceptance of the Constitution of 1812, and, though neither the 
majority of Basques or the Catalans really supported an absolute monarchy like 
Carlos dreamed of, many followed him for his promise to reintroduce autonomy for 
the regions. Though the majority of fighting took place in the Basque Country, 
Catalonia was also active in the Carlist front ("The Carlist Wars”). Unfortunately for 
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the Catalans, however, their hopes of autonomy diminished with the defeat of the 
Carlists, the exile of María Cristina to France, and a new regent in power (Kern, 
1990: 196, R. Smith, 1965: 314-28). Throughout all the political changes in the 
following years, Catalonia remained on the outskirts of policy. Though Barcelona 
was an important site for many revolts and battles, Catalonia was not well-
represented in Madrid during this time, leading to the rise of Catalan nationalism.  
Catalonia in the Modern Era  
 The political turmoil that plagued Spain in the 19th century had devastating 
consequences on the Spanish economy. The war with Napoleon ruined the 
landscape and the loss of colonial conquests in the New World meant the loss of 
trade partners and raw good suppliers. This meant that Spain was completely 
bankrupt and a few steps behind the rest of Europe in matters of industry. Catalonia 
suffered just as the rest of the country did, however their entrance into the 
Industrial Revolution was swifter and more successful than the rest of Spain 
because of their strategic location and resources (“The cultural 'Renaixença'…”). As 
political and royal leaders fought for the Crown in Madrid, middle and upper class 
Catalans turned Barcelona and other Catalan cities into centers of production and 
trade. Soon, Catalonia was once again the most economically successful region in the 
country. Even after the cotton crisis after the American Civil War could not subdue 
the Catalan textile market completely However, Catalonia still could not grow to its 
full potential without political policies to protect the region. The constantly 
changing and ineffective government in Madrid did hardly anything to protect 
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Catalan imports and exports, angering the industrial bourgeoisie Catalans were 
becoming frustrated with their lack of influence in the government and the constant 
infighting that occurred in Madrid. These frustrations coupled with the growing 
nationalism in other parts of Europe in the mid 1800 caused a renaissance of 
Catalan identity. (“The cultural 'Renaixença'…”) 
 The renaixença was the Catalan response to European romanticism. A 
complete revival of Catalan literature and language took place with emphasis on the 
“glory days” of Catalan history. Authors and artists romanticized Catalonia’s early 
history with the Greeks and reminded the public of when the Kingdom of Catalonia 
was the most powerful in the Mediterranean (“The cultural 'Renaixença'…”). 
Originally just a cultural movement of the intelligentsia and elite, it quickly spread 
to the middle classes and spawned the Catalan nationalist movement. Catalanism as 
a political ideology formed from the renaixença. It called for the self-governing and 
autonomy of Catalonia. Leaders of the movement (mainly the industrial 
bourgeoisie) campaigned for an autonomous Catalonia but not an independent 
state. They knew that Catalonia could not survive without Spain nor Spain without 
Catalonia. However, Catalonia could also not survive without any say in government 
policies, thus Catalanism was born. (“The cultural 'Renaixença'…”) 
Catalan leaders in Madrid campaigned for a federal state in which Catalonia, 
along with other regions like Galicia, the Basque Country and Aragon, would remain 
a part of Spain, but be self-governing (“The cultural 'Renaixença'…”). Catalan 
federalism was the most popular political ideology in Catalonia during the mid-19th 
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century though Carlism and other ideologies remained as minorities during the last 
third of the 19th century under King Alfonso’s rule. The loss of Cuba frustrated the 
Catalan bourgeoisie who relied on Cuban trade and raw goods to support their 
businesses causing Catalanism to develop further (“América y Cataluña”). The 
movement was subdivided into different factions such as the Carlists, who favored 
Catalan autonomy under an absolutist monarchy and the Republicans, who favored 
a self-governing Catalonia under a federal Spain.  Other smaller factions include 
anarchists and far left leaning groups. Despite the varying ideologies within these 
factions, the most important goal was to gain Catalan influence in Madrid. With this 
in mind, the Lliga Regionalista (the Regionalist League) was formed as a sort of 
umbrella organization designed to combine all factions under a common cause 
(“Political Catalanism…”). The idea of a unified league of different political 
ideologies coming together under the common goal of autonomy serves as an 
important basis for the nationalist movement today. 
La Lliga campaigned for more rights for Catalonia but Alfonso XIII was not 
receptive to the demands. The landscape of Spain and Catalonia in the early 20th 
century was tumultuous to say the least. The first two decades of the 1900s in 
Catalonia were characterized by constant protests against the Spanish government 
and harsh retaliation for these protests. Uprisings against the regime occurred all 
over Spain, but especially in Catalonia. A particular set of protests against Spanish 
territorial losses in Morocco set off a string of counter attacks by the monarchy in 
what was called the “Tragic Week” in Barcelona (“Political Catalanism…”). Hundreds 
were jailed or killed in an attempt to subdue angry Catalans.  
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 The Spanish monarchy was crumbling and revolution was seemingly 
inevitable. In a last ditch attempt to consolidate his power, Alfonso XIII supported a 
successful military coup by Primo de Rivera.  Primo de Rivera was an intelligent, 
well-spoken military genius who, after gaining power, successfully managed the 
military campaigns in Morocco, encouraged industrial development and, to 
Catalonia’s delight, interacted with socialist labor unions (“La crisis de la 
restauración …”). Eventually, due to intense pressure from Spanish citizens and the 
economic effects of the Great Depression in 1929, Alfonso removed Primo de Rivera 
from power. Primo de Rivera’s replacements were much less successful than Primo 
de Rivera, so, after almost two years of chaos, Alfonso surprisingly relinquished his 
crown and fled Spain. With the end of the monarchy in Spain, the Second Spanish 
Republic was officially declared in 1931. (“La crisis de la restauración …”) 
 The Second Spanish Republic brought a new era for Catalan nationalism. 
After the abdication of Alfonso XIII and Spain officially became a republic, Catalonia 
declared itself a Catalan Republic under the Spanish Republic (Colomines i 
Companys, 2008: 67). The new Catalan republic reinstalled the Generalitat, which 
had been absent for decades, led by the Esquerra Republicana de Cataluyna, or Left 
Republicans of Catalonia. This political party controlled the Generalitat and thus the 
new autonomous Catalonia. The leader of the Esquerra, Francisco Macía was, 
personally, a proponent of Catalan independence. However, most Catalan political 
leaders, even many in his own party, stressed the idea of a Catalan republic within 
the Spanish state. (Colomines i Companys, 2008: 67-8) 
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In complete contrast to past (and future) interactions, the Catalan and 
Spanish leaders worked together surprisingly well during the transition to the 
republic.  Macía worked with Spanish officials in the task of creating a statute of 
autonomy for Catalonia in order to define its place in the Second Republic. The 
Catalan government (which had not held elections yet and consisted of Macía and a 
few other political officials) drafted a preliminary statute called the Statute of Núria. 
The statute called for a federal Spain, self government of all Catalan lands (including 
Valencia, the Balearic Islands and parts of Aragon), Catalan being the only official 
language of Catalonia, Catalan control of taxes, establishment of a Catalan 
parliament, justice system, and council, and Catalan control of various aspects of 
their economy, including industry and agriculture. This statute was too extreme for 
the government in Madrid, which required many amendments before ratification. 
(Colomines i Companys, 2008: 68-9) 
The Constitution of 1931 put a stop to many of the autonomous aspirations 
of Catalonia, and after a lengthy debate in Spanish parliament; the statute was 
approved with extreme modifications. The revised statute allowed for the creation 
and promotion of the Catalan parliament and granted it the right to control certain 
aspects of Catalonia’s economy. The document restricted Catalan calls for a 
monolingual state but instead approved a bilingual society with Spanish and Catalan 
being the co-official languages. The new statute also severely reduced Catalan 
competencies in the field of education and contained a provision that allowed for 
the unilateral interference of the Spanish government whenever it deemed 
necessary (Colomines i Companys, 2008: 69-70). 
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 Though the statute was diminished significantly, it was still seen as a success 
by many Catalans as it reinvigorated Catalan culture and brought back Catalan self-
government. The Esquerra Republicana remained in power from 1931-1934 with 
relatively little competition, though the Lliga was still influential in Catalonia. The 
liberal Generalitat and the liberal Spanish parliament worked together frequently 
for two years with relatively few issues. In 1934, however, power switched from a 
liberal government in Madrid to a conservative one. The advancement of the 
conservative Spanish government allowed more radical conservatives access to the 
government, paving the way for the end of the Republic (Colomines i Companys, 
2008: 70). The anti-autonomy right wing parties in the Spanish government gained 
more power due to the economic instability. The economy also affected confidence 
in the Esquerra as protests by anarchists, conservatives, and pro-Spanish 
nationalists began to pop up. In 1934, Lluís Companys, president of Catalonia, 
announced that he, along with the rest of the Catalan parliament, would work 
toward making the Generalitat the only power in Catalonia. He stressed, however, 
that he was not searching for independence for Catalonia, rather, he wanted the 
Generalitat to have as much power as possible. This reality was never achieved 
however, as the political landscape of Spain took a sharp turn in 1936. (Colomines i 
Companys, 2008: 70-7) 
The military coup of 1936 brought the beginning of the end for the Second 
Spanish Republic. The Nationalists, consisting of Carlists, fascists, monarchists, and 
far right-leaning conservatives had control of Spanish Morocco and much of the 
mid-western portions of Spain (R. Smith 1965). Their goal was to overthrow the 
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Republicans and replace the democratic system with an absolutist ruler. The 
Nationalists were led by General Francisco Franco, the infamous military leader 
turned dictator. Though originally not a fascist himself, Franco incorporated fascism 
into the Nationalist agenda due to pressure from the Falange, an organization based 
on Italian fascism founded by Primo de Rivera’s son, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. 
Franco saw success early on, capturing most of the western border of Spain from the 
Republicans in the first year of the war. With help from Germany and Italy, Franco 
continued his successful campaign. German dictator Adolf Hitler came to Franco’s 
aid as his Luftwaffe bombed the Basque city of Guernica in 1937, completely 
destroying the town and the Basque resistance (R. Smith 1965). 
As the war advanced on, the Catalan leadership began to work closer 
together with the state leadership in Madrid. Tensions were high between the two 
entities, though, because of Companys’ declaration of Catalan sovereignty a just a 
couple of years before, and the failure of the Republican military to stop Franco’s 
quick advance closer and closer to Catalonia. Eventually, in 1938, Companys 
repealed the sovereignty statute and Catalonia once again became an autonomous 
entity within the Spanish state. However, this gesture was insignificant as Franco 
had already advanced his troops capturing most of Catalonia and setting the stage 
for his eventual rule over all of Spain. (Colomines i Companys, 2008: 82-4) 
 1939 brought about the final crushing defeat of the Republicans and any 
hope for Catalan autonomy. As the last Republicans fell, Franco began his 
persecution of anyone who opposed his regime. Catalan leaders fled to France or 
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England fearing for their lives. Former Catalan soldiers were sent to labor camps or 
forced into manual labor in Catalan cities. Any Catalan leaders that remained in 
Spain were captured and “tried” by military tribunals that were notoriously biased 
and often only took 10 minutes to hear each case. From these trials, over 3,500 
rebels, including Companys, were sentenced to execution by firing squad from 
1939-1953 (“La Guerra Civil…”). 
 Franco had a plan to Castilianize all of Spain, despite the diversity that 
existed in all corners of the state. This meant a complete cleanse of all things 
Catalan. Firstly, Franco dissolved the Statute of Autonomy effectively ridding 
Catalonia of any political say within the Franco government (“La Guerra Civil…”). 
Catalonia and other “culturally different” regions like the Basque Country, Galicia, 
and Valencia suffered similar fates as the lines dividing these communities were 
basically eradicated and they were incorporated into Franco’s “unified Spain” (R. 
Smith, 1965: 477). In an effort to maintain his power and diminish opposition, 
Franco criminalized all non-Castilian languages, traditions, and culture (“El 
franquismo en Cataluña”). Until 1951, it was illegal to create any cultural works, 
such as literary works and art, which were “Catalan” (or Basque or Galician) (“El 
franquismo en Cataluña”). Catalan was also prohibited in public life, including in all 
schools and workplaces. If a Spanish soldier or officer heard it spoken outside the 
home, the speaker was chastised or even jailed for insubordination. A common 
phrase was ‘If you are Spanish, speak the language of the Empire’. Franco even went 
so far as to change the names of streets, buildings, and public areas from their 
original Catalan to a more “appropriate” Castilian Spanish name. Catalan traditions 
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like the sardana, a Catalan dance, and castilos de humanos, (human acrobatic 
towers) were banned from the public sphere while “traditional” Spanish cultural 
activities were promoted like flamenco dancing and bull-fighting. All church services 
were performed in Latin or Spanish, not Catalan, and Catholicism became the 
mandatory religion for the entire nation. Traditional Catalan names were prohibited 
for newborns as each new child was required to have a Christian, Spanish name (“El 
franquismo en Cataluña”). Using the Catalan (or Basque) version of someone’s name 
was frowned upon in the public sphere and potentially punishable by Franco’s 
police.  
 Despite the repression of Catalan cultural institutions and the destruction of 
Catalonia’s political institutions, Catalan nationalism survived in various forms. 
Exiled after the Republican loss in the Civil War, Catalan political leaders continued 
to meet in France (“The occupation of Catalonia.”). The Generalitat resumed after 
the end of World War II in 1944 with Josep Irla leading as President, though this 
government was short lived. In 1954, a new figure stepped forth for the Catalonians 
in exile. Josep Tarradellas was elected president of the Generalitat by Catalans in 
exile in Mexico. Though his election was controversial and relatively unknown to the 
Catalans back in Spain, the mere existence of the Generalitat was significant in the 
Catalans’ fight to save their culture from Franco’s attempts at extinction. While 
Catalans in exile pondered strategies for their return to Spain, the Catalans in 
Barcelona and other cities began small steps against Franco’s regime. In 1951, 
Catalans boycotted the use of the state-run tram system when fares were raised 
only in Catalonia while they remained the same in the rest of the provinces. 
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Syndicates and organizations formed and held illegal meetings with the purpose of 
voicing their discontent with Franco’s regime. Protestors singing Catalan songs and 
waving the flag of Catalonia frequented Barcelona’s plazas. The film industry was 
surprisingly successful in Catalonia, despite the extreme censorship laws in place. 
Anti-Franco themes were frequently hidden in films and music produced in 
Catalonia. Wealthy Catalans supported the movement by sending funds to the 
government in exile and funding secret meetings to the local Catalan nationalists 
(“The occupation of Catalonia.”) 
 In 1971, Catalan nationalism under Franco came to a head. Around 300 
leaders from all sectors of Catalan life met in Barcelona with the goal of creating a 
unified front against Franco (Guibernau, 2004: 66). Under the motto “Freedom, 
Amnesty and Statute of Autonomy,” the gathering attempted to put into words the 
goals of the Catalan nationalist movement since the establishment of Franco’s 
regime. According to official documents from the event, Catalan demands included 
the upholding of the democratic rights of freedom of speech, assembly and 
association, the right to trade unions, strikes and demonstration, amnesty for 
political prisoners, and the re-establishment of the Catalan institutions embodied in 
the Statute of Autonomy which guaranteed the right of self-determination. This 
event was momentous for many reasons. Firstly, it gathered leaders from different 
ends of the political spectrum and economic classes. Originally started by Catalan 
communist and socialist leaders, eventually center and right leaning leaders joined. 
This set the stage for future collaboration between political parties of opposite 
ideals for the common goal of furthering the nationalist agenda. Secondly, the 
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movement solidified the goals of Catalonia under the Franco regime. The assembly 
attendees clearly stated that Catalonia had the right to express their cultural identity 
while maintaining their place in Spain. Thirdly, the assembly itself became an 
organization that spearheaded campaigns for Catalan nationalism in the years that 
followed. (Guibernau, 2004: 64-5) 
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Part III: Strengthening Nationalism Post-Franco  
 On November 20, 1975, Spain’s fascist dictatorship came to an end as 
General Francisco Franco died. As he had decreed years earlier, the new leader of 
Spain was a monarch, specifically King Juan Carlos (“The restored Generalitat”). The 
new king descended directly from the Bourbon royal line in power before the 
Second Spanish Republic and Franco’s reign. It is in this time period that we see the 
establishment of the foundation for separatism. In the years before Franco, 
economic, political, and cultural trends developed, shaping Catalonia and its 
nationalist movement. However, it wasn’t until after Franco’s dictatorship had 
ended that these forces began to establish and re-establish themselves, 
strengthening the movement further and providing a solid foundation for which 
separatism could eventually thrive.  
Political Foundations 
 A de-centralized state system such as Spain’s, can contribute to the 
emergence of separatism. It is during this period that Spain developed this system of 
governance.  The main goal of the Crown and politicians after Franco’s death was to 
reform Spain into a constitutional monarchy while trying to satisfy multiple political 
parties and agendas (“The restored Generalitat”). In Catalonia, the momentum 
gained from the National Assembly meetings powered demands for the new 
national government to make accommodations for Catalonia. The first president of 
the new Spain, Adolfo Suaréz, made an effort to hear Catalan and Basque demands. 
He was aware of the growing regionalism throughout Spain and therefore was open 
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to Catalan demands to reinstate their political, cultural, and economic autonomy. In 
1977, the Generalitat was reinstated and Josep Tarradellas, in exile until this point, 
returned to reclaim his position as President of Catalonia. (“The restored 
Generalitat”) 
 The next step after the first democratic elections was the drafting of a 
constitution. The Constitution of 1978 is an extraordinary effort of multiple political 
parties, including anti-Francoists, reformist Francoists, conservative pro-Spain 
nationalists, and left-leaning regionalist leaders (Guibernau, 2004: 72). With the 
ratification of the constitution, Spain became a constitutional monarchy, 
reestablishing the Cortes Generales and making the King of Spain the Head of State 
(Span. Constitution). For Catalonia, the constitution was a great success in the 
campaign for autonomy. Section 2 of the document states that: “The Constitution is 
based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible 
homeland of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government 
of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among 
them all” (Span. Constitution). According to Section 143 of the document, “bordering 
provinces with common historic, cultural and economic characteristics, insular 
territories and provinces with a historic regional status,” may form self-governing 
autonomous communities. Thus, seventeen autonomous communities were 
established, including Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. In addition, the 
constitution guaranteed the right to use not only Castilian Spanish, but other 
languages native to Spain, including Catalan, Basque, Galician, and Aranese. Section 
3 of the document states: “The wealth of the different linguistic forms of Spain is a 
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cultural heritage which shall be especially respected and protected”. After forty plus 
years of persecution and repression, Catalan citizens were finally able to practice 
their culture, speak their language, and govern themselves.  
 This distinction recognizing the existence of a separate Catalan identity was 
highly significant. In the years before (especially under Franco’s rule), the 
acceptance of Catalan culture as distinct from Spanish culture was impossible to 
imagine. Now, not only was Catalan culture recognized, but it was protected by the 
constitution. Perhaps most significant is the implication that Catalonia is inherently 
different from the other regions of Spain, thus laying the foundation for separatist 
claims of “Catalonia is not Spain”. Likewise, the recognition of the Catalan 
nationality provided legitimacy to Catalan claims of nationhood which would appear 
later in the 21st century (although the constitution never actually states Catalonia is 
a nation and this fact is debated later on in the revision of the Statute of Autonomy 
of 2006 discussed later).  
 An additional provision in the constitution allowed for the autonomous 
communities to decide on the specific competencies each community would be 
responsible for and which it would delegate back to the Spanish state (Sections 142, 
148-9). This provision had the potential to lead to the de-centralization of the 
Spanish state. Each community was required to present a Statute of Autonomy 
which outlined the community’s competencies, official languages, and borders 
(Sections 143-5). Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy was officially ratified by Catalan 
voters and accepted by the Spanish parliament in 1979 (“History of the 
Jones 42 
 
Generalitat”). Unlike other Spanish autonomous communities, Catalonia’s Statute 
called for the highest extent of self-governing allowed by the national constitution 
(Statute of Autonomy 1979). For example, Catalonia created a Catalan police force, 
the Mossos d'Esquadra. In most other autonomous communities, the Guardia Civil, or 
Spanish National Police, are the only police force (“History of the Generalitat”). A 
separate healthcare system for Catalan citizens, management of Spanish prisons in 
Catalonia, and, of course, the use of Catalan as the main language in the public 
sphere also separated Catalonia from its fellow communities (Statute of Autonomy, 
title IX).  
 Under this statute, Catalonia became (along with the Basque Country) the 
most autonomous community in Spain. This level of autonomy is also important in 
regards to separatism. With the exception of a few areas such as immigration, 
national security, and taxes, Catalonia controls and regulates most of what occurs in 
its own region. Though Catalonia is not entirely self-sufficient, its level of autonomy 
provides a foundation for claims that Catalonia will be able to support itself after it 
separates from Spain. Pro-separatist leaders claim the region is functioning 
successfully with its current level of control and will be able to thrive if Catalonia 
was in complete control of its own affairs. Though the accuracy of this theory is 
questioned by anti-separatists, it is still considered a key argument in the separatist 
movement. To separatists, Catalonia has thrived despite Spanish interference; to 
anti-separatists, Catalonia has thrived because of Spanish interference. Whatever the 
true answer, the level of autonomy Catalonia obtained with the Statute of Autonomy 
of 1978 strengthened the political foundation for separatism if only because it 
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provided Catalonia with an opportunity to show it can control and be governed by 
itself successfully.  
 Likewise, the presence of Catalan nationalist political parties is another 
building block in the political foundation of Catalonia. After the death of Franco, 
Josep Tarradellas was named interim president until power was successfully 
transferred to Jordi Pujol. Pujol was the leader of the center-right, Catalan 
nationalist party the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia. This party is still alive 
and functioning today as part of a federation with the Democratic Union of 
Catalonia. Together, the two form the Convergence and Union Federation. What is 
significant about this political party, as well as about three other Catalan political 
parties, is that they are unique to Catalonia. There are not national branches of these 
parties in other autonomous communities. Though they may share similar platforms 
to the Catalan branches of the Popular Party or the Socialist Party, they operate only 
in Catalonia, for Catalonia. Furthermore, the Catalan nationalist parties have been 
successful in Catalonia, with nationalist parties being in power for 33 of the past 40 
years the Catalan parliament has been reinstated (“History of the Generalitat”). 
These nationalist parties have been vital in promoting not only Catalan nationalist 
interests, but separatist interests as well. Current Catalan president and CiU leader 
Artur Más is the head of the separatist movement and has been pushing for 
legislation and decrees that would make separatism possible and more likely. In 
January 2015 he even called for early parliamentary elections to try to gain more 
seats in parliament that were pro-separatism (Moffett and Román 2015). These 
parties represent Catalan interests instead of Spanish interests within Catalonia like 
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the Catalan branches of the PP and PSOE. Their mere presence strengthens Catalan 
nationalism because they put political power in the hands of Catalan nationalists as 
opposed to those campaigning for Spanish priorities. Their popularity shows exactly 
how strong the Catalan nationalist movement actually is as well. They also provide a 
solid foundation for separatism because they show that the loss of the national 
Spanish political parties after a potential split from Spain will be inconsequential as 
the governing body of Catalonia has its own parties from which it can rule.  
 The relationship between Catalonia and Spain is an issue as well. 
Traditionally, Catalan and Spanish leaders have butted heads over multiple issues, 
especially regarding Catalonia’s autonomy. Under Franco, Catalan leaders were 
executed, jailed, and exiled as most were in opposition to Franco. However, after his 
death Catalan and Spanish leaders began to work together to form solutions to 
Catalan issues and successfully transition to democracy. As time passed, though, the 
leaders of both groups began to clash more frequently, often over economic issues. 
By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, as the economic recession took 
its toll on the Spanish and Catalan economies, cooperation between the two sank to 
a new low and tensions ran high. Both sides claim the other is being unreasonable 
and accuse them of acting unconstitutionally. As recently as January 2015, the 
Spanish government announced that they may seek the arrest of Artur Más after he 
continued to hold the independence referendum in November 2014, even after it 
was declared illegal. The uncooperative attitudes between the two entities 
lengthens the divide between them, furthering the distrust of Spanish politicians 
and strengthening Catalan nationalism.  
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 In addition, the presence of the EU and NATO is significant in strengthening 
the foundations for Catalan nationalism. Multiple authors argue that the European 
Union has made separatism in Europe more attainable than it has been in the past. 
Christopher Connolly cites the Maastricht Treaty and its additional amendments as 
important steps in the creation of a region-friendly EU (Connolly, 2013: 2). The 
treaty allowed for the participation of regions within the EU by creating the 
Committee of Regions, establishing the Principle of Subsidarity, and promoting the 
idea of an over-arching European citizenship beyond simply the national and 
regional identities. He also cites the cultural and linguistic protection for regions in 
the form of funds from the “rights regime” as well as the ability for regions to 
participate in para-diplomacy outside of their state (Conolly, 2013: 79).  Mattias 
Bieri (2014) reiterates this and also points out that the EU provides many of the 
competencies that could cause difficulty to a small, newly independent state such as 
formation of a new currency, foreign policy, and security. If Catalonia becomes 
independent and joins NATO, then the issue of small-state security will be solved. 
Likewise, the common market of the EU also provides the promise of economic 
security and a continuation of current trade without much disruption (Bieri, 2014: 
3).  The EU, by promoting regional protections, strengthens Catalonia’s arguments 
for greater autonomy and recognition of Catalan issues. Likewise, the participation 
of Catalonia by itself with other regions and states of the EU strengthens the 
argument that Catalonia is able to function in European society without the “help” of 
Spain and will continue to do this if they become independent.  
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Economic foundations 
 Perhaps the most well-known facet of Catalan nationalism is the economic 
relationship between Spain and Catalonia. As shown in the previous chapters, 
Catalonia has almost always been one step ahead of the Spanish economy.  From 
Roman times to present day, Catalonia has been a hub for agriculture, trade, 
industry, and tourism. Spain has also been economically successful yet there has 
been a gap between the two entities for a while. After Franco’s death and Catalonia’s 
re-emergence, this gap became even wider.  
The OPEC oil crisis along with the transition to democracy in the 1970s was 
almost catastrophic for Catalonia and the rest of Spain. However, when the oil crisis 
finally ended and the world began to recover, Catalonia bounced back quickly 
(McRoberts, 2001: 95). Spain’s membership in the European Economic Community, 
approved in 1986, brought easy access to European markets for Catalonia and the 
rest of Spain. The late 1980s brought more and more tourists to Barcelona and the 
Costa Brava, creating thousands of jobs and prompting an increase in immigration. 
In 1992, Barcelona hosted the Summer Olympic Games. The event was a great 
success for Catalonia and Spain. Though the event was 400% over budget, the 
games brought a host of improvements to Catalan infrastructures that remain to this 
day. The games brought Catalonia and Spain together under the common cause of 
promoting a successful Olympic experience. Unemployment shrunk, tourism 
boomed, and miles of beaches were created by demolishing hundreds of industrial 
buildings along the coastline. Additionally, millions of dollars were invested in 
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sports facilities, teams and programs across the region in order to further the 
success of Catalan and Spanish athletes (McRoberts, 2001: 96-97). All of these 
investments, though costly, changed the landscape of Barcelona, and with it, 
Catalonia. Tourists came for the Olympics but stayed for the beaches and warm 
weather. The success of the Olympics brought a renewed confidence in Spain, 
proving to the world that Spain was no longer Franco’s domain. Catalonia benefitted 
from the direct investment in the region and increased tourism, solidifying its place 
in the world economy.  
The economic and political effects of the Olympics lasted throughout the 
1990s and into the 2000s. Barcelona became one of the most popular spots for 
international and Spanish vacationers alike. Throughout the beginning of the 2000s, 
Catalonia maintained an unemployment rate hovering in the 4-6% range and a GDP 
per capita comparable to the top earning European countries (IDESCAT, Eurostat). 
From 2005-2007, Spain saw a GDP growth rate of 4% and an unemployment rate 
hovering around a reasonable 9% (Eurostat). GDP per inhabitant was nearly 
$24,000 in 2006 and decently ranked in the top 15 of EU countries. Tourism was 
thriving and the housing market was booming. Catalonia was thriving as well. From 
2005-2007 Catalonia maintained a GDP growth similar to Spain’s at around 3.5% 
and a low unemployment rate averaging 6.6% (World Bank, IDESCAT). GDP per 
capita in Catalonia was $30,000, meaning that, if Catalonia was an independent 
member of the EU, it would be ranked 4th in highest GDP per capita in the EU. 
Spain’s ranking at this time was 13th (Eurostat).  
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These numbers indicate the massive success Catalonia was having in 
comparison to the rest of Spain and further show how the economy of Catalonia 
strengthens Catalan nationalism. Just as separate Catalan political parties imply an 
ability to survive without Spain, this disparity shows that Catalonia could not only 
survive, but also thrive without the economic safety net of Spain. Furthermore, it 
creates a superiority complex within Catalonia that Catalonia is and would be even 
better without the poorer regions of Spain weighing them down. This thought was 
further enhanced by the realization of a tax deficit with Spain. The 20% difference in 
GDP per capita between Catalonia and Spain caused Spain to take a higher percent 
of taxes from Catalonia than other autonomous regions. In 2009, Catalonia 
contributed around 13 million Euros to the “community pot” or the fund that the 
Spanish government uses to distribute funding to each community (IDESCAT). 
However, since Catalonia is less reliant on Spanish funds because they control more 
competencies than other communities, Catalonia only received around 3 million 
Euros in funding, which, according to the Catalan government, is still not sufficient. 
The deficit this created was part of the motivation for the introduction of the revised 
Statute of Autonomy (which will be discussed later on) and remains a main 
economic grievance in the separatist movement to this day. 
Cultural foundations 
 Though the politics and economy of Catalonia are important factors in 
Catalan nationalism, neither would have any meaning without the presence of a 
separate Catalan culture. This identity which developed in the middle ages has 
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remained the most important issue of Catalan nationalism. Without this distinct 
identity, separatism would be much less likely to occur and Catalan nationalism 
would be practically non-existent. As it stands, there is a distinct Catalan culture 
which is the driving force behind the nationalist movement. Despite numerous 
attempts to eradicate Catalan traditions and culture beginning in the 18th century 
and especially under Franco, the Catalan culture has survived and thrived.  
The growing sense of nationalism in the post-Franco era could be 
contributed to a similar phenomenon that occurred in the mid-19th century when 
Catalan nationalism first arose. The new Catalan renaissance that occurred after 
Franco’s death reflects the one that occurred in the mid-1800s. Historicism, the 
admiration of past Catalan glory, as well as a sense of martyrdom could be the 
causes for an increased interest in Catalan culture. During the time of Franco, all 
forms of Catalan identity were hidden under threat of jail. After forty years of 
persecution, the culture was almost lost entirely. An entire generation never learned 
the language or traditions. So, when Franco died, Catalan culture was promoted to 
an extreme. The Language Normalization Act of 1983 brought about a change in 
education. This act, which passed unanimously through Catalan parliament, 
attempted to revive the use of Catalan and promote it within the public sphere (“The 
democratic transition and…”). Specifics of the act called for the mandatory use of 
Catalan in all state-run media outlets, the use of Catalan as the primary language in 
elementary-high schools, and the subsidizing of language classes for teachers in 
public schools who were “strongly recommended” to learn Catalan. The effects of 
these laws were noticeable within the next few years. In 1975, only 14.5% of 
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Catalans were able to write and read in Catalan. However, by 1986, that number had 
increased to 31.5% and in 1996 that number was 45.8% (“The democratic 
transition and…”).  
The significance of these figures must be noted. The first Catalans to receive 
their education in Catalan and be exposed to the culture after Franco were those 
born in the final years of Franco’s reign and after 1975. Therefore, it is not a 
coincidence that these Catalans in their twenties and thirties, common ages for 
political involvement and activism, are marching in the streets demanding 
independence. These Catalans identify more with Catalonia than they do Spain, 
because they were raised as Catalans and not Spaniards. It would make sense for 
them to desire a country of their own as they seemingly don’t relate to Spaniards of 
their age. This thought is not limited to youth. In 2007, 41.2% of those surveyed by 
the Catalan government described themselves as equally Spanish and Catalan, 
29.4% said they were more Catalan than Spanish, and 17.1% said they only 
identified as Catalan (Baròmetre d’Opinió Política: Oct. 2007). In November of 2010, 
the percentage of those surveyed that identified as only Catalan had risen to 20.3% 
with 42.5% identifying as equally Spanish and Catalan and 25.5% identifying as 
more Catalan than Spanish (Baròmetre d’Opinió Política: Nov. 2010). By January 
2015, 35.8% identified as equally Spanish and Catalan, 23.4% identified as more 
Catalan than Spanish and 26.0% identified as only Catalan (Baròmetre d’Opinió 
Política: Jan. 2015). It is also important to note a similar upward trend in the 
number of Catalans supporting an independent Catalan state. In July 2009 19% of 
Catalans surveyed believed Catalonia should be an independent state. By July of 
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2010, this number had risen to 24.3% (Baròmetre d’Opinió Política: July 2009, July 
2010). As of January 2015, this percentage was around 39% (Baròmetre d’Opinió 
Política: Jan. 2015). It is apparent that there is a connection between the growing 
number of Catalans who do not identify as Spanish and those who think Catalonia 
should be an independent state.  
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Part IV: Triggering the Shift to Separatism 
 Up until the late 2000s Catalan nationalist demands focused on greater 
autonomy for Catalonia. As the 2000s came to a close, however, a few events 
triggered a shift in the movement. The economic, political and cultural factors which 
strengthened the nationalist movement and caused it to be a formidable political 
force in Spanish politics would combine and create a strong foundation for 
separatism that would be triggered by political and economic events. This shift to 
separatism would be vital in the development of Catalan nationalism and would 
force Spain and Europe to pay attention to Catalan demands.  
The Recession 
The economic downturn in the late 2000s had disastrous effects on the 
already strained economic relations between Spain and Catalonia. Catalonia’s 
economic grievances were exacerbated during the recession. Both Catalonia and 
Spain suffered greatly during the economic crisis. By 2010, Catalonia’s GDP growth 
was at .3% and unemployment was at 17.7% (IDESCAT). The economic downturn 
increased the already strained relations between Catalonia and Spain. Spain set a 
goal for each of its 17 autonomous communities to decrease its public deficit to 
2.4% by the end of 2010; however Catalonia ended the year with a deficit of 3.86% 
(Fidalgo 2011). In order to relieve some of the pressure on Spanish citizens, the 
government in Madrid began creating policies that directly affected Catalan citizens 
such as lowering the ticket price of trains and metros in Catalonia. However, this act, 
seemingly helpful to Catalan citizens, angered Catalan officials as it is the Catalan 
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regional government which operates the train systems in Catalonia and therefore 
receives the revenue from ticket sales. Lowering the price of tickets had a direct 
effect on the Catalan government but not the Spanish government which called for 
the decrease in price. Another grievance put forth by Catalonia was Spain’s decision 
to not add money to the Competitiveness Fund, an account which was formed to 
close the tax deficit between the state and the wealthier autonomous communities. 
Because of this decision, the Spanish government owed Catalonia over 1.35 million 
Euros in 2010 (Fidalgo 2011). These examples, along with others, caused frustration 
in the Catalan government. Francesc Homs, spokesman for the Catalan parliament, 
said in an interview with the Catalan News Agency in March of 2011 “The Spanish 
Government cannot be adopting decisions which represent more expenditure for 
the Catalan Government and afterwards criticizing us for spending too much money 
without compensating us for this extra expenditure.”   
The recession had extreme consequences but in Catalonia it may have had 
the most impact. It surely contributed to the already present economic grievances 
and strained relationship with Spain. The tax deficit and Catalonia’s “subsidizing” of 
poorer regions of Spain, which were issues present even before the recession, were 
suddenly in the spotlight as, according to separatists, major causes to Catalonia’s 
economic woes. Likewise, the austerity measures made by the Spanish government 
directly affected its autonomous communities. The conservative government in 
Madrid made decisions, like the choice to lower public transport fees, which were to 
benefit the country as a whole rather than the individual communities (Fidalgo 
2011). The recession also removed any hope of fiscal reform for Catalonia and Spain 
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as both regions sunk deeper into the recession. Spain could not afford a new fiscal 
agreement with Catalonia regarding its tax system that would potentially take away 
extra funds from Catalonia. Catalonia, however, needed a tax reform to improve 
their economic situation. As a result, tensions continued to grow as the recession 
worsened. In 2010, tensions came to a head when Spain’s unwillingness to negotiate 
was confirmed when the Spanish Supreme Court made a ruling on Catalonia’s 
revised Statute of Autonomy.   
The Statute of Autonomy Ruling 
  In 2005, the Catalan parliament began drafting a revision to the Statute of 
Autonomy ratified in 1979. The Estatut was controversial in nature mainly because 
it defines Catalonia as a nation within Spain. The document states “In reflection of 
the feelings and wishes of the citizens of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia has 
defined Catalonia as a nation by an ample majority (Preamble of the Statute of 
Autonomy). The Statute also revises Catalonia’s economic agreement with the 
government in Madrid, instead suggesting an economic system modeled after the 
Economic Agreement the Basque Country has with Madrid (Statute of Autonomy 
2006: art. 223). Specifically, article 223 sought to practically cease Spanish taxation 
on Catalan citizens by instead giving Catalonia power over their own tax systems. 
Other small, yet important, changes were included in the revision as well. Catalonia 
will receive more control over their airports and prison, more say in immigration 
matters relevant to the region, and greater legal jurisdiction (BBC). The Statute also 
specifies that Catalan will be the primary language of schools, government, and in 
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the public sphere (Article 6). While the first statute also included provisions stating 
Catalonia’s right to use Catalan as an official language, the 2006 version implies the 
eventual disappearance of Spanish in the public sphere and encourages the use of 
Catalan as the only language in the region (with the exception of Occitan in the 
region of Aran in Catalonia) (Article 6, preamble).  
The document passed through the Generalitat very easily and was ratified by 
Catalan voters with 73.9% in favor of the document, though only 49% of the 
electorate voted (“Els detalls de la sentència”).. Despite the strong statements made 
in the document, the Spanish government was supportive of the referendum. Then 
Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero, a member of the PSOE or People’s 
Socialist party supported the referendum stating it would give Catalonia "greater 
recognition of the [Catalan] identity" (“Els detalls de la sentència”). Though the 
document was ratified by the Catalan people, the policies would not go into effect 
until the revisions were reviewed by the Spanish High Courts.  
 After four years, in July of 2010 the Spanish Constitutional Court released 
their ruling on the constitutionality of the revised Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 
2006. The review of the revised Statute of Autonomy produced a controversy that 
would set the tone for Catalan/Spanish relations for the years ahead. The most 
significant changes the Spanish Constitutional Court made were in regards to 
Catalan claims of being a nation. According to the ruling, “The interpretation of the 
references to ‘Catalonia as a nation’ and to ‘the national reality of Catalonia’ in the 
preamble of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia have no legal effect,” (“Els detalls 
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de la sentència”). The court also ruled that the Catalan plans for a new financial 
agreement were unacceptable according to the constitution. According to the court, 
since there was no historical precedent for a Catalan financial agreement, like there 
was in the Basque Country, the new agreement was unconstitutional. Other minor 
articles were disputed, though none as important as Catalonia’s status as a nation or 
their financial agreement. After the constitutional court removed the 
unconstitutional sections from the 2006 Statue of Autonomy, it began to look very 
similar to the 1978 Statute of Autonomy. In short, nothing much was changed in 
regards to Catalonia’s status within Spain.  
The release of Spain’s ruling on Catalonia came as a shock to Catalans and 
Spaniards alike. While many had predicted the courts to dispute Catalan claims, the 
sheer amount of drastic changes was a surprise to those in office as well as Catalan 
citizens. It became apparent that Spain was unwilling to negotiate with Catalonia on 
changing the definition of Catalans in Spain. Although Zapatero supported the 
revised statute, the opposition party, the conservative People’s Party, opposed the 
revised statute, worrying that it gave too much power to Catalonia and threatened 
the unity of Spain. The constitutional court was thus divided between the 
progressive judges and the conservative judges, with a compromise eventually 
being reached 6-4. (“Un millión de personas…”) 
The full report of the ruling was released on July 9, 2010. Almost 
immediately, Òmnium Cultura, a group promoting Catalan culture and language, 
began organizing a protest of the ruling to take place in Barcelona “Un millión de 
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personas…”). Through social media platforms, the event was organized within 24 
hours. The event was originally planned for three days after the ruling yet Catalan 
citizens began to gather the next afternoon at the corner of the two busiest streets in 
Barcelona. From the intersection of Las Ramblas and Passeig de Gracía, Catalan 
citizens began to march, shouting "Libertad, Amnistía y Estatuto de Autonomía", or 
Liberty, Amnesty and Statute of Autonomy, the same phrase uttered years before at 
demonstrations during the democratic transition. The march was led by the then 
president of Catalonia, José Montilla, alongside political leaders from his party and 
four others, including future Catalan president Artur Más. Other Catalan institutions 
sent representatives as well, including the ex-president of the most popular Catalan 
institution, the FC Barcelona soccer team. Reports vary on exactly how many people 
attended the event. The Òmnium Cultura claims over 1.5 million people were a part 
of the march, though the Barcelona police claim just over 1.1 million, and the 
Spanish government claims fewer than 1 million attended (“Un millón de 
personas…”).  
 This ruling provided the push that the Catalan nationalist movement needed 
to make the transition into separatism. The struggling economy and the tensions it 
created between the Catalan and Spanish governments frustrated the Catalan 
people. Then, when the Spanish government, through the constitutional courts, 
effectively rescinded their promise for more Catalan autonomy as a solution to 
Catalonia’s economic woes, it was “the straw that broke the camel’s back”. Not 
surprisingly, as public opinion leaned more towards the prospect of independence, 
the political parties’ position of independence shifted as well. Though it was claimed 
Jones 58 
 
to be unrelated, the Catalan nationalist CiU party sponsored a bill that banned 
bullfighting in Catalonia beginning in 2011 (Noguer, Geli & Roger 2010). Bullfighting 
was a popular Spanish past time but has never been a significant part of Catalan 
culture. The supporters of the bill claimed it was a way to promote tourism and 
respond to the growing trend of anti-bullfight mentality in Spain and the rest of the 
world. However, some opponents claimed the bill was anti-Spanish propaganda a 
way to further widen the divide between Catalonia and Spain (Noguer, Geli & Roger 
2010). Nevertheless, the bill passed and in 2011 bullfighting was banned in all of 
Catalonia. The party that sponsored the bill was the same to win the absolute 
majority of seats in the regional elections in November of 2010.  
The ruling PSOE were replaced by the nationalist CiU party in December 
2010 with Artur Más at the head (“Elecciones autonómicas 2012 en Cataluña”). Más 
was one of the political party leaders present at the independence march in July and 
had repeatedly reiterated his party’s anger at the ruling (Noguer, Geli & Roger 
2010). Though the CiU was not officially a separatist party (yet), it promised to 
protect the rights of Catalans and to seek a new fiscal agreement with Madrid 
(Noguer, Geli & Roger 2010). In September of 2012,  Más followed through on his 
promise to negotiate an updated economic agreement with Spain. However, the 
meeting with Mariano Rajoy, the conservative Spanish PM was unsuccessful.  Rajoy 
refused to budge on creating a system similar to the Basque system and Más would 
not alter his plan to fall under Rajoy’s guidelines ("La Reunión Rajoy-Más…”). Más is 
quoted as saying that Rajoy’s response was “a no without nuances.” (Minder 2012).  
Only a few days after the meeting, Más and the CiU officially announced their 
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support for independence and, surprisingly, their alliances with the ERC and SI, left 
leaning Catalan nationalist political parties that also support independence. With 
the successful alliance between the parties, Más was able to push through 
parliament a bill that stated the Catalan people had the right to decide whether or 
not they would remain a part of Spain (Noguer & Piñol 2012).  
Though the separatist movement may not have been directly caused by the 
actions of Catalan politicians, the CiU’s support of the movement facilitated its 
growth. Más’s main agenda since 2012 has been openly supporting Catalonia’s right 
to decide and promoting an independent Catalan state. Likewise, the Òmnium 
Cultura, originally just an NGO supporting the promotion of Catalan traditions, 
became a Catalan independence organization, coordinating independence marches 
and protests since 2010. Even the actions of Rajoy and the PP politicians in 
Catalonia have influenced the movement. Through their strong disapproval of the 
movement and their refusal to negotiate with separatist leaders, the PP has 
contributed to the anti-Spanish sentiment that it trys so hard to combat.  
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Part V: Conclusions and the Future of the Movement 
It is difficult to predict whether the pro-separatists will achieve their goal of 
an independent Catalan state. They face many obstacles before Catalonia could be 
seen as “a new European state”. Más has used his executive power to call for early 
elections in September 2015 in order to maintain the momentum of the movement 
and fill the parliament with representatives from his own party and the separatist 
ERC (del Olmo and Ríos 2015). According to Más, the vote will serve as a pseudo-
referendum in which Catalans have the opportunity to vote for leaders that are 
specifically dedicated to breaking with Spain. If the pro-separatists gain the majority 
in parliament, Más has a plan for Catalonia to become independent in 18 months 
(Moffett and Román 2015). According to this plan, the separatist parties, called 
“Yes” parties by Más, will begin the process of drafting a new constitution and 
planning the transition to an independent democratic state (“Agreement to declare 
independence…”). The Generalitat will then draft a declaration of sovereignty that 
will establish Catalonia’s position outside of Spanish control and therefore not 
subject to Spanish constitutional codes regarding separatism (“Agreement to 
declare independence…”).  
To some, these claims seem ambitious as support for Catalan independence 
outside of Catalonia is hardly overwhelming. Rajoy has been adamant in his 
disapproval of Más and the entire movement. Support from outside of Spain has 
been slim, with many European countries wary of supporting a separatist 
movement for fear of setting a precedent for their own separatist regions. Support 
for independence has even dwindled within Catalonia as opinion polls have Más’s 
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party and other “Yes” parties failing to receive the majority vote in parliament if the 
elections were held today. Likewise, the number of supporters of Catalan 
independence has diminished to 39% of the population, comparable to 49% in 2012 
(Baròmetre d’Opinió Política: Jan. 2015). Yet Más and his allies vow to achieve their 
goal of an independent Catalan state, 
Likewise, even if the separatists complete their 18 month plan for separation, 
would Catalonia remain in the EU? Would other countries, recognize its 
sovereignty?  Would corporations and citizens boycott Catalonia as has been 
promised? Would the economic transition be successful? These questions are being 
asked by both parties in an attempt to understand what an independent Catalonia 
would look like. Now that Scotland’s referendum failed, Catalonia is at the fore-front 
of European separatist politics. The case of Catalonia will set a precedent for the 
dozens of separatist movements popping up all over Europe. If Catalonia declares 
independence from Spain, the European and world community will have to make a 
decision whether or not to recognize the new state as legitimate. If they do, then the 
EU must decide the next course of action in regards to admitting Catalonia into the 
organization.  
 Yet, even despite these obstacles, it could be possible for the movement to 
succeed. The factors that strengthen Catalan nationalism are the same factors that 
could eventually lead to the success of separatism. Though public support seems to 
be wavering, continued hostility from the Spanish government could lead to a 
greater distrust of national politicians. Similarly, the economy in Spain continues to 
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struggle despite the recovery of most of the rest of Europe. Support for Más and the 
CiU could rise again if Spain’s economy continues to flounder as more and more 
Catalans seek a different option. Likewise, Rajoy’s austerity measures are unpopular 
in Spain and it is likely the PP will lose many seats (if not their entire majority) 
during the national election in December 2015. If the PSOE defeats the PP, an 
independent Catalan state may have a chance of being recognized. The PSOE has 
been known to be more receptive to Catalan demands for autonomy and could be 
more willing to negotiate a legal independence referendum. Though PSOE leaders 
are not supportive of Catalonia leaving Spain, they might be more willing to 
negotiate reforms to satisfy separatists. Furthermore, if the Catalan nationalist 
parties gain more seats in parliament during the national elections, they could 
influence politics at the national level by encouraging a more amicable split with 
Spain and thus increasing the likelihood of EU recognition and acceptance. Just as 
the recession and the court ruling triggered the shift to separatism, a similar event 
occurring in the next few months could cause a shift in either direction. Public 
support for separatism could fall rapidly or rise quickly in response to a 
hypothetical triggering event.  
 In reality, the exact future of the movement is unknown. However it cannot 
be denied that Catalan nationalism is no longer simply a Catalan issue. Thousands of 
years of political, economic, and cultural foundation building have elevated Catalan 
nationalism to a global scale, forcing Catalonia’s neighbors to recognize its demands 
for autonomy. The movement is truly unique with even the closest comparable 
movement, the Scottish nationalist movement, showing distinct differences. 
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Catalonia is in the position to set a precedent not only for the other regions of Spain, 
but for other regions of Europe. Actions taken by Catalonia, Spain, and the EU will 
determine the course of action for Flanders, the Basque Country, and even Veneto in 
the future. The formation of an independent Catalonia will finally bring truth to the 
statement so many Catalans have been saying for decades “Catalunya no es 
Espanya.” 
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